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Abstract
Using the “trilemma in��exes” ��evelope�� �y Aizenman et al. (2008) that measure 
the extent of achievement in each of the three policy goals in the trilemma—
monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness—this 
paper examines how policy configurations affect macroeconomic performances 
with focus on the Asian economies. We find that the three policy choices do 
not matter for per capita economic growth. However, they ��o matter for output 
volatility and the medium-term level of inflation. Greater monetary independence 
is associate�� with lower output volatility while greater exchange rate sta�ility 
implies greater output volatility, which can �e mitigate�� if a country hol��s 
international reserves (I�) at a higher level than a threshol�� (a�out 20% of gross 
domestic product). Greater monetary autonomy is associated with a higher level 
of inflation while greater exchange rate stability and greater financial openness 
could lower the inflation level. We find that trilemma policy configurations and 
external finances affect output volatility mainly through the investment channel. 
While a higher ��egree of exchange rate sta�ility coul�� sta�ilize the real exchange 
rate movement, it coul�� also make investment volatile, though the volatility-
enhancing effect of exchange rate sta�ility on investment can �e cancelle�� 
by holding higher levels of IR. Greater financial openness helps reduce real 
exchange rate volatility. These results in��icate that policy makers in a more 
open economy woul�� prefer pursuing greater exchange rate sta�ility an�� greater 
financial openness while holding a massive amount of IR. Asian emerging market 
economies are found to be equipped with macroeconomic policy configurations 
that help the economies to ��ampen the volatilities in �oth investment an�� real 
exchange rate. These economies’ sizea�le amount of international reserves 
hol��ing appears to help enhance the sta�ilizing effect of the trilemma policy 
choices, which explains the recent phenomenal �uil��up of international reserves 
in the region.

�. �ntroduction
Originating from the financial crisis in the United States (US), the waves of the global 
crisis quickly hit har�� so many countries, inclu��ing those in Asia, in the summer of 
2008, ��evastating economies on a glo�al scale �y the en�� of 2008. Accor��ing to the 
International Monetary �un�� (IM�), all of the US, the Euro area, an�� Japan are expecte�� 
to experience negative output growth in 2009 for the first time in the post-World War II 
era. Emerging an�� ��eveloping economies are expecte�� to grow at a mere 1.7%, plunging 
from 8.3% in 2007 an�� 6.0% in 2008. Asia is no exception�� newly in��ustrialize�� Asian 
economies are expecte�� to shrink �y 2.4% in 2009, an�� the two high-growth economies 
in Asia, People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, are predicted to significantly slow 
��own to 7.5% an�� 5.4%, respectively. Clearly, countries have experience�� the worst 
global economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
By the summer of 2009, however, there are some, �ut mosaic, signs of recovery among 
some countries. Even the US, the epicenter of the crisis, starte�� to show some signs of 
recovery �y the fall of 2009. Although smaller economies seem to continue to �e in a 
frail situation, �igger emerging economies in Asia starte�� reporting economic ��ata that 
suggest ro�ust recovery. In the secon�� quarter of 2009, emerging Asian economies’ gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annualized rate of over 10% while the US’ 
fell �y 1%. As of 23 July 2009, the Asian Development Bank Chief Economist Jong-Wha 
�ee commente�� “Emerging East Asia coul�� see a V-shape�� recovery, with growth ��ipping 
sharply in 2009 �efore regaining last year’s pace in 2010.”1 
The V-shape�� recovery in Asia, if that ever happens, is not unprece��ente��. In fact, that 
is how many economies in the region reacte�� to the Asian crisis of 1997/1998. Despite 
a severe output contraction in 1998, Asian crisis economies ��i�� make a remarka�le 
come�ack with ro�ust growth in exports an�� output as early as in 1999. Park an�� �ee 
(2002) attribute the quick comeback of the crisis-inflicted economies to their openness 
an�� close link to the rest of the worl��. Asia’s quick �ounce this time is not only impressive 
�ut also surprising given that, unlike in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the US economy 
does not provide the “demand of last resort” (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2008) that can fill 
the foregone ��eman�� in the worl�� economy. 
 Asian Development Bank News Release on 23 July 2009, www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2009/2944-east-asian-
economics-growths/ 
If the Asian economies coul�� show ro�ust an�� sustaina�le recovery while the a��vance�� 
economies ��o not, that coul�� involve two implications. �irst, ro�ust recovery can �e 
interprete�� as evi��ence for the Asian economies “��ecoupling” from the a��vance�� 
economies. Secon��, it coul�� also mean that economies in the Asian region, most of 
which are quite open to international trade in goods and financial assets, are better 
prepare�� to cope with economic crises in a highly glo�alize�� environment. �igure 1 
shows that output volatility—measure�� �y the stan��ar�� ��eviations of per capita output 
growth rates—for Asian emerging market economies has �een maintaine�� at low levels 
compara�le to those of the in��ustrialize�� countries. This suggests that these economies 
may have a��opte�� international economic policies that allow them to experience �etter 
macroeconomic performance. While we still have to wait a few more years to con��uct 
meaningful analysis on the “��ecoupling” issue, we can investigate whether Asian 
economies are �etter-suite�� to cope with glo�alization �y examining what has happene��. 
This will �e the main focus of this paper.
Figure 1: Output Volatility, 1972 – 2006 
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Output Volatility: Industrial vs. Asia vs. Non-Asian LDC
DMG = emerging market economies, LDC = less developed country.
Notes:  Output volatility is measured by 5-year standard deviations of the growth rate of per capita output. The data for per capita 
output are extracted from the Penn World Table database. Appendix 2 shows the countries included as “EMG Asia” or 
emerging market economies in Asia.
To examine policy configurations in the context of international macroeconomics, 
this paper focuses on a very powerful hypothesis in international finance called 
the “impossi�le trinity,” or the “trilemma.” The hypothesis states that a country may 
simultaneously choose any two, �ut not all, of the following three goals: monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration. This concept, if valid, is 
suppose�� to constrain policy makers �y forcing them to choose only two out of the three 
policy choices. In fact, among many international monetary and financial arrangements 
that have been in place since the Gold Standard system, each set of arrangements 
impose�� ��ifferent choices on countries.
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Given that Asian emerging market economies have collectively outperformed other 
��eveloping economies in terms of output growth sta�ility, it can �e their international 
macroeconomic policy management, ��etermine�� within the constraint of the trilemma, 
that have contri�ute�� to making these economies �etter prepare�� for higher vulnera�ility 
possi�ly exacer�ate�� �y recent glo�alization. 
As such, this paper will investigate how policy configurations based on the trilemma affect 
the macroeconomic performance of the economies, with focus on emerging markets 
in Asia. Given the complexity of the dynamics of policy choices and macroeconomic 
performances, it is most appropriate an�� effective to con��uct panel ��ata analysis to 
unravel the peculiarity, if there is, of international macroeconomic policies of these 
economies. More specifically, using the “trilemma indexes” developed by Aizenman 
et al. (2008) that measure the extent of achievement in each of the three policy 
goals, this paper will examine how policy configurations based on the trilemma affect 
macroeconomic performances such as output growth, output volatility, inflation volatility, 
and the medium rate of inflation for developing countries.
�urthermore, this stu��y focuses on output volatility an�� attempts to i��entify the channels 
�y which the trilemma policy choices affect output volatility. As can��i��ate channels, the 
volatilities of investment an�� the real exchange rate will �e examine��. This exercise 
should yield inferences about how policy configurations can differ depending on the 
extent of openness of the economy. 
Section 2 briefly reviews the theory of the trilemma and also assesses the development 
of the three macroeconomic policies �ase�� on the trilemma �y using the “trilemma 
in��exes.” Section 3 con��ucts a more formal analysis on how the policy choices affect 
macroeconomic policy goals, namely, output growth, output volatility, inflation rates, 
and the volatility of inflation. We will examine the implications of the estimation results 
for Asian economies. In Section 4, we exten�� our empirical investigation to investigate 
the channels by which international macroeconomic policy configurations affect output 
volatility. Section 5 presents conclu��ing remarks. 
��. The “�mpossible Trinity” or “Trilemma”:  
Theory and Evidence
A. Brief Review of the Theory
Although it is ��e�ata�le whether the worst is over for the current glo�al crisis, it at least 
has put the current international financial architecture or individual countries’ international 
macroeconomic policies into question as symbolized by the series of G20 meetings 
in Washington, D.C., �on��on, an�� Pitts�urgh. Some commentators emphasize�� the 
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G20 meetings’ parallelism to the series of meetings to determine the post-World War II 
international financial architecture held in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.
Whatever configuration of international financial architecture or international 
macroeconomic policies policy makers consi��er, conceptually, they cannot avoi�� 
confronting the “impossi�le trinity,” or the “trilemma”—a hypothesis that states that a 
country simultaneously may choose any two, �ut not all, of the three goals of monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration. 
The trilemma is illustrate�� in �igure 2. Each of the three si��es—representing monetary 
independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration—depicts a potentially 
��esira�le goal, yet it is not possi�le to �e simultaneously on all three si��es of the 
triangle. The top vertex, la�ele�� “close�� capital markets”, is, for example, associate�� 
with monetary policy autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime, but not financial 
integration.2 
Figure 2: The Trilemma
Closed Financial Markets
and Pegged Exchange Rate
e.g., Bretton Woods system
Financial Integration
Floating
Exchange Rate
Monetary Union
or Currency Board
e.g., Euro system
Monetary
Independence
Exchange Rate
Stability
Since the Gold Standard system, different international financial systems have attempted 
to achieve com�inations of two out of the three policy goals. The Bretton Woo��s system 
sacrificed capital mobility for monetary autonomy and exchange rate stability. The Euro 
system is built upon the fixed exchange rate arrangement and free capital mobility, but 
a�an��one�� monetary autonomy of the mem�er countries. �or many years until recently, 
��eveloping countries ha�� pursue�� monetary in��epen��ence an�� exchange rate sta�ility, 
but kept their financial markets closed to foreign investors. 
The fact that countries have a��opte�� com�inations of two out of the three policy choices 
an�� altere�� the com�inations as a reaction to crises or major economic events must 
mean that each of the three policy options is a mixe�� �ag of �oth merits an�� ��emerits for 
managing macroeconomic con��itions. 
2 See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005) for further discussion and references dealing with the trilemma.
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Monetary in��epen��ence allows the monetary authorities of an economy to have autonomy 
over its macroeconomic management. An economy with a high ��egree of monetary 
in��epen��ence shoul�� �e a�le to sta�ilize the economy through monetary policy without 
�eing su�ject to other economies’ macroeconomic management. Hence, monetary 
in��epen��ence can potentially lea�� to sta�le an�� sustaina�le economic growth. However, 
in a worl�� with price an�� wage rigi��ities, policy makers can manipulate output movement 
(at least in the short-run), which means that policy makers with greater monetary 
autonomy could lead to increasing output and inflation volatility. Furthermore, it is also 
possible that monetary authorities abuse their autonomy to monetize fiscal debt, and 
therefore end up destabilizing the economy through high and volatile inflation. 
Exchange rate sta�ility coul�� �ring out price sta�ility �y provi��ing an anchor, lessening 
risk premium �y mitigating uncertainty, there�y fostering investment an�� international 
tra��e. Also, at the time of an economic crisis, maintaining a pegge�� exchange rate 
coul�� increase the cre��i�ility of policy makers an�� there�y contri�ute to sta�ilizing 
output movement (Aizenman, et al., 2009). However, greater levels of exchange rate 
fixity could also rid policy makers of a policy choice of using exchange rate as a tool to 
a�sor� external shocks. Prasa�� (2008) argues that exchange rate rigi��ities woul�� prevent 
policy makers from implementing appropriate policies consistent with macroeconomic 
reality, so that they woul�� �e prone to cause asset �oom an�� �ust through overheating 
the economy. Hence, the rigidity caused by exchange rate fixity could not only enhance 
output volatility, �ut also cause misallocation of resources an�� un�alance��, unsustaina�le 
growth. 
�inancial li�eralization is pro�a�ly the most contentious an�� hotly ��e�ate�� policy among 
the three. Theory predicts that more open financial markets could lead to economic 
growth through more efficient resource allocation, mitigating information asymmetry, 
enhancing an��/or supplementing ��omestic savings, an�� helping transfer of technological 
or managerial know-how (i.e., growth in total factor pro��uctivity). Also, economies with 
greater access to international capital markets shoul�� �e a�le to sta�ilize themselves 
through risk sharing and portfolio diversification. However, as financial liberalization 
increased its pace over the last two decades, financial openness gets the blame for 
economic insta�ility for these years as was the case in a series of crises in the late 1990s 
and the current crisis. Based on this view, financial openness could expose economies 
to volatile cross-border capital flows including sudden stop or reversal of capital flows, 
there�y making economies face �oom-�ust cycles (Kaminsky an�� Schmukler, 2002).
3 Aghion, et al. (2005) argue that, for an economy equipped with well-developed financial markets, 
reduction in uncertainty could enhance more efficient allocation of capital that could lead to higher 
productivities. 
4 Henry (2006) argues that only when it fundamentally changes productivity growth through financial market 
development could equity market liberalization policies have a long-term effect on investment and output 
growth. Otherwise, the effect of financial liberalization should be shortlived, which may explain the weak evidence 
on the link between financial liberalization and growth.
5 For a summary on the cost and benefits of financial liberalization, refer to Henry (2006) and Prasad and Rajan 
(2008).
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Thus, theory tells us that each one of the three trilemma policy choices can �e a ��ou�le-
edged sword, which should explain the wide and mixed variety of empirical findings on 
each of the three policy choices. �urthermore, to make matters more complicate��, while 
there are three ways of pairing two out of the three policies (i.e., three vertexes in the 
triangle in �igure 2), the effect of each policy choice can ��iffer ��epen��ing on the policy 
choice it is paire�� with. �or example, exchange rate sta�ility can �e more ��esta�ilizing 
when it is paired with financial openness. But if it is paired with greater monetary 
autonomy (i.e., closed financial markets), it can be stabilizing. Hence, the three types of 
policy com�inations may as well �e su�ject to empirical scrutiny, which nee��s to �e ��one 
in comprehensive an�� systematic ways.
B.  The “Trilemma �ndexes” 
Despite its pervasive recognition, there has �een almost no empirical work that tests 
the concept of the trilemma systematically. Many of the stu��ies in this literature often 
focus on one or two varia�les of the trilemma, �ut fail to provi��e comprehensive analysis 
on all of the three policy aspects of the trilemma.7 This is partly �ecause of the lack of 
appropriate metrics that measure the extent of achievement in the three policy goals. 
Aizenman et al. (2008) overcame this deficiency by developing a set of the “trilemma 
in��exes” that measure the ��egree of three policy choices countries make with respect 
to the trilemma. Using these in��exes, we teste�� whether the in��exes are linearly relate�� 
to each other, and we confirmed that a change in one of the trilemma variables would 
in��uce a change with the opposite sign in the weighte�� average of the other two. This 
means, as theory pre��icts, countries ��o face the tra��e-off of the three policy choices.8 
The “trilemma in��exes” are create�� for more than 170 countries for 1970 through 2007. 
The monetary in��epen��ence in��ex (MI) is �ase�� on the correlation of a country’s interest 
rates with the �ase country’s interest rate. The in��ex for exchange rate sta�ility (E�S) is 
an invert of the exchange rate volatility, i.e., stan��ar�� ��eviations of the monthly rate of 
��epreciation, for the exchange rate �etween the home an�� �ase countries. The ��egree 
of financial integration is measured with the Chinn-Ito (2006, 2008) capital controls 
in��ex (KAOPEN). More ��etails on the construction of the in��exes can �e foun�� in the 
Appen��ix 1. 
6 Monetary independence is often discussed in the context of the impact of central bank independence or inflation 
targeting such as Alesina and Summers (993) and Cechetti and Ehrmann (999) among many others. On the 
impact of the exchange rate regime, refer to Ghosh et al. (997), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), and 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2003). The empirical literature on the effect of financial liberalization is surveyed by 
Edison et al. (2002), Henry (2006), Kawai and Takagi (2008), and Prasad et al. (2003).
7 Of course, the notable exceptions include the papers by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005, 2008, and 2009) 
and Shambaugh (2004).
8 We also showed that major crises in the last four decades, namely, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the 
debt crisis of 982, and the Asian crisis of 997/998, caused structural breaks in the trilemma configurations.
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C. Development of the Trilemma Dimensions 
Comparing theses indexes provides interesting insights into how the international financial 
architecture has evolve��. �igure 3 shows the trajectories of the trilemma in��exes for 
different income country groups. For the industrialized countries, financial openness 
accelerate�� after the �eginning of the 1990s while the extent of monetary in��epen��ence 
has starte�� a ��eclining tren��. After the en�� of the 1990s, exchange rate sta�ility rose 
significantly. All these trends reflect the introduction of the euro in 1999.    ��       9
Figure 3: Development of the Trilemma Configurations Over Time
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EMG = emerging market economies, ERS = exchange rate stability, IDC = industrialized countries, KAOPEN = capital account 
openness, LDC = less developed country, MI = monetary independence.
9 If the euro countries are removed from the sample (not reported), financial openness evolves similarly to the 
industrialized countries group that includes the euro countries, but exchange rate stability hovers around the line 
for monetary independence, though at a bit higher levels, after the early 990s. The difference between exchange 
rate stability and monetary independence has been slightly diverging after the end of the 990s.
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Developing countries on the other han�� ��o not present such a ��istinct ��ivergence of 
the in��exes, an�� their experiences ��iffer ��epen��ing on whether they are emerging or 
non-emerging market ones.10 �or emerging market economies, exchange rate sta�ility 
��ecline�� rapi��ly from the 1970s through the mi��-1980s. After some retrenchment after the 
early 1980s (in the wake of the debt crisis), financial openness started rising from 1990 
onwar��. �or the other ��eveloping countries, exchange rate sta�ility ��ecline�� less rapi��ly,      
and financial openness trended upward more slowly. In both cases, though, monetary 
in��epen��ence remaine�� more or less tren��less. 
Interestingly, for the emerging market economies, the in��exes suggest a convergence 
towar�� the mi����le groun��, even as talk of the ��isappearing mi����le rose in volume. This 
pattern of results suggests that ��eveloping countries may have �een trying to cling to 
moderate levels of both monetary independence and financial openness while maintaining 
higher levels of exchange rate sta�ility—leaning against the trilemma in other wor��s—
which interestingly coinci��es with the perio�� when some of these economies starte�� 
hol��ing siza�le international reserves, potentially to �uffer the tra��e-off arising from the 
trilemma.11 
None of these o�servations are applica�le to non-emerging ��eveloping market countries 
(�igure 3[c]). �or this group of countries, exchange rate sta�ility has �een the most 
aggressively pursue�� policy throughout the perio��. In contrast to the experience of the 
emerging market economies, financial liberalization is not proceeding rapidly for the non-
emerging market ��eveloping economies.
To she�� further light on the concept of the trilemma, a����ing one more ��imension to 
the three trilemma ��imensions is helpful. That is the role of international reserves (I�) 
hol��ing. Since the Asian crisis of 1997/1998, ��eveloping countries, especially those 
in East Asia an�� the Mi����le East, have �een rapi��ly increasing the amount of I� 
hol��ing. The P�C, the worl��’s largest hol��er of I�, currently hol��s a�out $2 trillion of 
reserves, accounting for 30% of the worl��’s total. As of the en�� of 2008, the top 10 
�iggest hol��ers are all ��eveloping countries, with the sole exception of Japan. The nine 
��eveloping countries, inclu��ing  P�C, �epu�lic of Korea (Korea), �ussian �e��eration, 
an�� Taipei,China, hol�� a�out 50% of worl�� I�. Against this �ack��rop, it has �een argue�� 
that one of the main reasons for the rapi�� I� accumulation is countries’ ��esire to sta�ilize 
exchange rate movement. One perspective hol��s that countries accumulate massive I� 
to achieve some target com�ination of exchange rate sta�ility, monetary policy autonomy, 
and financial openness. 
0 The emerging market economies are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during 
980–997 by the International Financial Corporation. For those in Asia, emerging market economies are 
“Emerging East Asia-4” defined by Asian Development Bank plus India.
 Willett (2003) has called this compulsion by countries with a mediocre level of exchange rate fixity to hoard 
reserves the “unstable middle” hypothesis (as opposed to the “disappearing middle” view).
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�or example, a country pursuing a sta�le exchange rate an�� monetary autonomy may try 
to liberalize cross-border financial transactions while determined not to give up the current 
levels of exchange rate sta�ility an�� monetary autonomy. This sort of policy com�ination, 
however, coul�� make the monetary authorities motivate�� to hol�� a sizea�le amount 
of I� so that they can sta�ilize the exchange rate movement while retaining monetary 
autonomy. Or, if an economy with open financial markets and fixed exchange rate faces a 
nee�� to lax monetary policy in��epen��ently, it may �e a�le to ��o so—though temporarily—
as long as it hol��s a massive amount of I�. Thus, evi��ently, one cannot ��iscuss the issue 
of the trilemma without incorporating a role for I� hol��ing.
The “Diamon�� charts” in �igure 4 are useful in tracing the changing patterns of the 
trilemma configurations while incorporating IR holding. Each country’s configuration at a 
given instant is summarize�� �y a “generalize�� ��iamon��”, whose four vertices measure
Figure 4: The “Diamond Charts”: Variation of the Trilemma and �R Configurations Across 
Different Country Groups
Industrialized Countries
Monetary Independence
Emerging Asian Economies
Monetary Independence
Non-Asian LDC
Monetary Independence
Emerging Asian Economies
Monetary Independence
Financial
integration
(Up to 2007)
Exchange Rate
Stability
Financial
integration
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Exchange Rate
Stability
Financial
integration
(Up to 2007)
Exchange Rate
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International Reserves/GDP International Reserves/GDP
Center is at 0
1
.4
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.8
Center is at 0
International Reserves/GDP
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Financial
integration
(Up to 2007)
Exchange Rate
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International Reserves/GDP
Center is at 01971–1980
1981–1990
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.2
1
.4
.6
.8
.2
1
.4
.6
.8
.2
1
.4
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.8
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GDP = gross domestic product, LDC = less developed country, IR = international reserves.
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monetary independence, exchange rate stability, IR/GDP, and financial integration 
with the origin normalized so as to represent zero monetary independence, pure float, 
zero international reserves, and financial autarky. Figure 4 summarizes the trends for 
in��ustrialize�� countries, emerging Asian economies, non-emerging market ��eveloping 
Asian countries, non-Asian ��eveloping countries, an�� �atin American emerging market 
economies.
In Figure 4, we can observe again the divergence of the trilemma configurations for the 
industrial economies—a move toward deeper financial integration, greater exchange rate 
sta�ility, an�� weaker monetary in��epen��ence over the years. But this group of countries 
has re��uce�� the level of I� hol��ing over years unlike the other country groups. Once we 
shift our attention to regional comparison of the trilemma configurations, Asia, especially 
those economies with emerging markets, looks ��istinct from other groups of countries.12 
The ��iamon�� chart for Asian emerging market economies shows that the mi����le-groun�� 
convergence we o�serve�� for the emerging market economies group in �igure 3 is quite 
evi��ent for this group of economies, an�� that it is not a recent phenomenon for these 
economies. Since as early as the 1980s, the three in��exes have �een clustere�� aroun�� 
the mi����le range, although exchange rate sta�ility is the most pervasive policy choice an�� 
the ��egree of monetary in��epen��ence has �een gra��ually ��ropping. This characterization 
��oes not appear to �e applica�le to the other groups of ��eveloping economies, whether 
or not they are Asian. �atin American emerging market economies appear to have gone 
through a ��istinctively ��ifferent path of ��evelopment compare�� to the Asian counterparts. 
Most importantly, the group of Asian emerging market economies stan��s out from the 
others with their sizea�le an�� rapi��ly increasing amount of I� hol��ing, which may make 
one suspect potential implications of such I� hol��ings on trilemma policy choices an�� 
macroeconomic performances. 
���. Regression Analyses
Although the a�ove characterization of the trilemma in��exes allows us to o�serve the 
��evelopment of policy orientation among countries, it fails to i��entify countries’ motivations 
for policy changes. Hence, we examine econometrically how the various choices 
regarding the three policies affect final policy goals, namely, high economic growth, output 
growth stability, low inflation, and inflation stability.
The estimation mo��el is given �y:
y TLM IR TLM IR X Z Dit it it it it it t i it= + + + × + + + +α α α α ε0 1 2 3( ) Β Γ Φ  (1)
yit is the measure of macro policy performance for country i in year t, i.e., per capita 
2 Appendix 2 lists the “Asian Economies” included in the sample.
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output growth, output volatility, inflation volatility, and the medium-term level of 
inflation.13 TLMit is a vector of any two of the three trilemma in��exes, namely, MI, ERS, 
an�� KAOPEN. Aizenman et al. (2008) have shown that these three measures of the 
trilemma are linearly relate��. Therefore, it is most appropriate to inclu��e two of the 
in��exes simultaneously, rather than in��ivi��ually or all three jointly.14 TRit is the level 
of international reserves (excluding gold) as a ratio to GDP, and (TLMit x TRit) is an 
interaction term �etween the trilemma in��exes an�� the level of I�, that may allow us to 
o�serve whether I� complements or su�stitutes for other policy stances.
Xit is a vector of macroeconomic control varia�les that inclu��e the varia�les most use�� 
in the literature. More specifically, for the estimation on economic growth, Xit inclu��es 
income per capita from the initial year of each 5-year panel, average investment ratio 
to GDP, years of schooling (based on Barro and Lee, 2001), population growth, trade 
openness (=(EX+IM)/GDP), and private credit creation (percent of GDP) as a measure 
of financial development. The regressions on output volatility, inflation volatility, and the 
level of inflation include relative income (to the US per capita real income—based on 
Penn Worl�� Ta�le), its qua��ratic term, tra��e openness, the terms-of-tra��e (TOT) shock 
defined as the 5-year standard deviation of trade openness times TOT growth, fiscal 
procyclicality (measure�� as the correlations �etween Ho��rick-Prescott (HP)-��etren��e�� 
government spending series and HP-detrended real GDP series), 5-year average of 
M2 growth, private credit creation (as percent of GDP), the inflation rate, and inflation 
volatility, with some variation of inclu��e�� varia�les ��epen��ing on the ��epen��ent varia�le. 
Zt is a vector of glo�al shocks that inclu��es the change in US real interest rate, the worl�� 
output gap, an�� relative oil price shocks (measure�� as the log of the ratio of oil price 
in��ex to the worl��’s consumer price in��ex). Di is a set of characteristic ��ummies that 
inclu��es a ��ummy for oil exporting countries an�� regional ��ummies. Explanatory varia�les 
that persistently appear to be statistically insignificant are dropped from the estimation.ε it  
is an i.i.d. error term. 
The estimation mo��el is also exten��e�� �y inclu��ing a vector, ExtFinit, of external finances, 
that includes net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, net portfolio inflows, net “other” 
inflows (which mostly include bank lending), short-term debt, and total debt service. 
For net capital flows, we use the International Financial Statistics (IFS) data and define 
them as external liabilities (= capital inflows with a positive sign) minus assets (= capital 
inflows with a negative sign) for each type of flows. Negative values mean that a country 
experiences a net outflow capital of the type of concern. Short-term debt is included as 
the ratio of total external ��e�t an�� total ��e�t service as is that of gross national income 
(GNI). Both variables are retrieved from the World Development Indicators. 
3 Output growth is measured as the 5-year average of the growth rate of per capita real output (using Penn World 
Table 6.2); output volatility is measured as the 5-year standard deviations of the per capita output growth rate; 
inflation volatility as the 5-year standard deviations of the monthly rate of inflation; and the medium-term level of 
inflation as the 5-year average of the monthly rate of inflation.
4 That means that for each dependent variable, three types of regressions, i.e., those with three different 
combinations of two trilemma variables, are estimated.
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The ��ata set is organize�� into 5-year panels of 1972–1976, 1977–1981, 1982–1986, 
1987–1991, 1992–1996, 1997–2001, 2002–2006. All time-varying varia�les are inclu��e�� 
as 5-year averages. The regression is con��ucte�� for the group of less ��evelope�� 
countries (LDC) and a subgroup of emerging market economies (EMG). The estimation 
mo��el for economic growth will �e �ase�� on the one use�� in Kose et al. (2009), namely, 
(OLS) with fixed effects and system (GMM), and the model for output volatility, inflation 
volatility, and the level of inflation, on Aizenman et al. (2008), i.e., the robust regression 
mo��el that ��ownweights outliers that can arise in �oth the ��epen��ent varia�le an�� 
explanatory variables such as inflation volatility. 
A. Estimation Results of the Basic �odels
 1. Output Growth
�or the estimation, we use a parsimonious mo��el akin to that of Kose et al. (2009), an�� 
three estimation methods: pooled OLS, fixed effects (FE) model (with robust standard 
errors clustered by country) to factor out country-specific effects, and system GMM to 
control for potential en��ogeneity.15 We test the variables that are often found significant, 
as mentione�� a�ove.16 The regression results are reporte�� in Ta�le 1-1 for ��eveloping 
countries an�� Ta�le 1-2 for emerging market economies, for the three estimation 
metho��s.
5 For the fixed-effects estimation, time-fixed effects are also included. The system GMM estimation is conducted 
using the two-step method and Windmeijer (2005) standard errors with finite-sample correction. We treat initial 
levels of per capita income, investment ratio, total years of school, and population growth rate as endogenous 
and instrument using 2nd lag. Time-fixed effects are also included in the estimation and treated as exogenous 
instruments.
6 Neither the IR variable nor the interaction terms between trilemma variables and IR are included in the estimation 
because of the lack of theoretical rationale for the link between IR holding and economic growth.
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In �oth Ta�les 1-1 an�� 1-2, across ��ifferent mo��els, the results for the macroeconomic 
control variables are mostly consistent with the literature. The negative coefficient on the 
(log of) initial per capita income level evi��ences the convergence effect (though not foun�� 
in the GMM estimation). The investment ratio, and population growth to a lesser degree, 
are positive an�� negative contri�utors, respectively, to per capita output growth. �inancial 
��evelopment is foun�� to �e a positive contri�utor �ut only in the O�S estimation. Tra��e 
openness has an am�iguous effect�� it is a negative factor in the O�S mo��el for the �DC 
sample whereas it turns to be a positive one for the EMG when the FE model is used.
The trilemma varia�les enter the estimation relatively weakly, �ut this is consistent with 
the am�ivalent theoretical pre��ictions of the trilemma policy choices as ��iscusse�� a�ove. 
The effect of the trilemma varia�les is only capture�� �y the �E mo��el for �oth �DC an�� 
EMG sample. Greater exchange rate stability is expected to lead to higher economic 
growth, a consistent result with Dubas et al. (2005) and De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004). 
These findings may indicate that exchange rate stability promotes price stability and 
pre��icta�ility for investment, there�y lowering the country risk premium an�� eventually 
the interest rate. While we must �e aware that the �E mo��el fails to incorporate cross-
sectional variation an�� that the num�er of o�servations for the time ��imension is small, 
these results may capture the effect of policy changes.
Besi��es the econometric issues, we must also note the possi�ility that the KAOPEN in��ex 
may not capture the actual ebb and flow of cross border capital and its impact. Edwards 
(1999) ��iscusses that the private sector often circumvents capital account restrictions, 
nullifying the expecte�� effect of regulatory capital controls. More recently, the P�C’s 
de facto openness, ��espite its de jure closeness, is often the su�ject of researchers 
(Aizenman and Glick, 2008, Prasad and Wei, 2007, and Shah and Patnaik, 2009).
Against this �ack��rop, we augment our estimation mo��el �y inclu��ing de facto measures 
of capital account openness—measured by net inflows of FDI, portfolio investment, 
and bank lending—to incorporate the effect of actual external financing. Including these 
varia�les may a����ress two important issues with the Asian economies. �irst, on the de 
facto basis, Asia is more financially open than what the de jure measures show (Shah 
an�� Patnaik, 2009). Hence, it is important to inclu��e de facto measures of financial 
openness while controlling for de jure levels of financial openness.17 Secon��, as �igure 5 
shows, Asia is on average a net recipient of �DI, �ut is a net provi��er of portfolio 
investment and bank lending. Hence, using net inflows of different types of capital should 
a���� more su�tlety to the analysis.
Ta�le 2-1 reports the results for ��eveloping countries an�� Ta�le 2-2 reports the results for 
emerging market economies from the augmented model that includes the net inflows of 
�DI, portfolio investment, an�� “other” investment (which mostly consists of �ank len��ing), 
7 We could also argue that while the de jure measures may reflect policy makers’ intentions, de facto ones may 
represent actuality in cross-border capital flows.
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short-term ��e�t, an�� total ��e�t service. To conserve space, the estimation results on the 
�asic macroeconomic control varia�les are omitte��. We also note that this estimation 
exercise loses many o�servations especially for economies with me��ium-income levels, 
such as Korea an�� Singapore, �ecause the ��e�t-relate�� varia�les are not availa�le for 
��eveloping economies with relatively high income levels. Also, to isolate the effect of 
external financing from currency crises, we include a dummy for currency crises.18
8 The currency crisis dummy variable is derived from the conventional exchange rate market pressure (EMP) index 
pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (996). The EMP index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, the percentage loss in international reserves, and the nominal interest rate. The weights 
are inversely related to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample of countries, with an 
adjustment for countries that experienced hyperinflation following Kaminsky and Reinhart (999). For countries 
without the necessary data to compute the EMP index, the currency crisis classifications in Glick and Hutchison 
(200) and Kaminsky and Reinhart are used. 
Figure 5: Regional Comparison of Net Capital �nflows
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The estimation results for the trilemma varia�les are mostly intact. Exchange rate sta�ility 
continues to �e a growth enhancer in the �E mo��els of �oth samples. �inancial openness 
is now found to be a growth enhancer in one of the system-GMM models for EMG. 
Among the external finance variables, not surprisingly, the variable for total debt services 
(as percent of GNI) is found to hamper output growth, especially for the LDC sample. 
Short-term ��e�t is also negatively associate�� with economic growth, �ut only in the O�S 
mo��els. 
The variables for net capital inflows do not appear to perform well, except for net “other” 
or bank lending inflows in some of the models. This result has an important implication for 
Asia because bank lending is the most pervasive form of cross-border capital flow in the 
region. Our results present some, �ut weak evi��ence that cross-�or��er �ank len��ing may 
have supplemente�� ��omestic saving an�� contri�ute�� to economic growth.
 2. Output Volatility 
One of the reasons for the relatively weak results for the trilemma configurations in the 
growth regression can �e �ecause policy arrangements relevant to the trilemma may 
primarily affect the volatilities in output or inflation, and then indirectly, output growth. 
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) find that macroeconomic volatility and long-run economic 
growth are negatively relate��, an�� that the negative link is consi��era�ly larger for the 
last two ��eca��es.19 As such, we now investigate the effect of the trilemma configurations 
on other varia�les relevant to macroeconomic performances �y replacing the ��epen��ent 
variable of equation (1) with the variables for output volatility, inflation volatility, and the 
level of inflation. The estimation results are shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2.
9 They also investigate the determinants of the negative link and find that the negative link can be exacerbated 
by underdevelopment of institutions, intermediate stages of financial development, and inability to conduct 
countercyclical fiscal policies.
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Overall, macroeconomic varia�les retain the characteristics consistent with what has �een 
foun�� in the literature. In the regression for output volatility (shown in columns (1) through 
(3) of Ta�les 3-1 an�� 3-2), the higher the level of income is (relative to the US), the more 
re��uce�� output volatility is, though the effect is nonlinear. The �igger change occurs in 
US real interest rate, the higher output volatility of ��eveloping countries may �ecome—
in��icating that the US real interest rate may represent the ��e�t payment �ur��en on these 
countries. The higher TOT shock there is, the higher output volatility countries experience, 
consistent with �o��rik (1998) an�� Easterly, et al. (2001) who argue that volatility in worl�� 
goo��s through tra��e openness can raise output volatility.20 Countries with procyclical 
fiscal policy tend to experience more output volatility while countries with more developed 
financial markets tend to experience lower output volatility though they are not statistically 
significant.21 The results hol�� qualitatively for the su�sample of emerging market 
economies though the statistical significance tends to appear weaker. 
Among the trilemma indexes, monetary independence is found to have a significantly 
negative effect on output volatility�� the greater monetary in��epen��ence one em�races, 
the less output volatility the country tends to experience, naturally reflecting the impact 
of sta�ilization measures.22,23 Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) find that countries 
that adopt inflation targeting—one form of increasing monetary independence—are 
foun�� to re��uce output volatility, an�� that the effect is �igger among emerging market 
economies.24 This volatility-re��ucing effect of monetary in��epen��ence may explain the 
ten��ency for ��eveloping countries, especially non-emerging market ones, to not re��uce 
the extent of monetary in��epen��ence over years.
Countries with more sta�le exchange rate ten�� to experience higher output volatility 
for both LDC and EMG groups, which conversely implies that countries with more 
20 The effect of trade openness is found to have insignificant effects for all subgroups of countries and is therefore 
dropped from the estimations. This finding reflects the debate in the literature, in which both positive (i.e., 
volatility enhancing) and negative (i.e., volatility reducing) effects of trade openness has been evidenced. The 
volatility-enhancing effect in the sense of Easterly et al. (200) and Rodrik (998) is captured by the term for 
(TOT*Trade Openness) volatility. For the volatility reducing effect of trade openness, refer to Calvo et al. (2004), 
Cavallo (2005, 2007), and Cavallo and Frankel (2004). The impact of trade openness on output volatility also 
depends on the type of trade, i.e., whether it is inter-industry trade (Krugman, 993) or intra-industry trade (Razin 
and Rose,994).
2 For theoretical predictions on the effect of financial development, refer to Aghion, et al. (999) and Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (200). For empirical findings, see Blankenau, et al. (200) and Kose et al. (2003).
22 Once the interaction term between monetary independence and IR holding is removed from the estimation 
model, the coefficient of monetary independence becomes significantly negative with the 5% significance level in 
model () of the LDC sample and in models () and (2) of the EMG sample.
23 This finding can be surprising to some if the concept of monetary independence is taken synonymously to 
central bank independence because many authors, most typically Alesina and Summers (993), have found more 
independent central banks would have no or at most, little impact on output variability. However, in this literature, 
the extent of central bank independence is usually measured by the legal definition of the central bankers and/or 
the turnover ratios of bank governors, which can bring about different inferences compared to our measure of 
monetary independence.
24 The link is not always predicted to be negative theoretically. When monetary authorities react to negative supply 
shocks, that can amplify the shocks and exacerbate output volatility. Cechetti and Ehrmann (999) find the positive 
association between adoption of inflation targeting and output volatility.
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flexible exchange rates will experience lower levels of output volatility, as was found 
in E��war��s an�� �evy-Yeyati (2003) an�� Haruka (2007). However, the interaction term 
is foun�� to have a statistically negative effect, suggesting that countries hol��ing high 
levels of international reserves are a�le to re��uce output volatility. The threshol�� level of 
international reserves holding is 13–18% of GDP.25 Singapore, a country with a mi����le 
level of exchange rate sta�ility (0.50 in 2002–2006) an�� a very high level of international 
reserves holding (100% as a ratio of GDP), is able to reduce the output volatility by 2.7-
2.9 percentage points.26 The P�C, whose exchange rate sta�ility in��ex is as high as 
0.97 and whose ratio of reserves holding to GDP is 40% in 2002–2006, is able to reduce 
volatility �y 1.4–1.7 percentage points.
When the model is extended to incorporate external finances, whose results are reported 
in Ta�les 4-1 an�� 4-2, generally, the control varia�les remain qualitatively unchange��, �ut 
the trilemma variables slightly increase their statistical significance. Among the trilemma 
in��exes, greater monetary in��epen��ence continues to �e an output volatility re��ucer. The 
nonlinear effect of greater exchange rate sta�ility in interaction with I� hol��ing remains, 
but the threshold level is found to be 12.6% of GDP in model (3) for developing countries 
an�� 18–19% for emerging market economies.
Countries with more open capital accounts ten�� to experience lower output volatility 
according to Table 4-1. However, those with higher IR holding than 23% of GDP can 
experience higher volatility by pursuing more financial openness, which is somewhat 
counterintuitive.27 
25 In Model (3) of Table 3-, ˘ ˘ ( )α α1 3TLM TLM IRit it it+ ×  for ERS is found to be 0 009 0 067. . ( )ERS ERS IRit it it− ×  or 
( . . )0 009 0 067− IR ERSit it . In order for ERS to have a negative impact, 0 009 0 067 0. .− <IRit , and therefore, it 
must be that IRit > =0 0090 067 0 13
.
. . . 
26 See Moreno and Spiegel (997) for an earlier study of trilemma configurations in Singapore. 
27 The result of model (2) in Table 4- is consistent with those of models () and (3). That is, model (2) predicts that 
if a country increases its level of monetary independence and financial openness concurrently, it could reduce 
output volatility. As long as the concept of the trilemma holds true, i.e., the three policy goals are linearly related, 
as Aizenman et al. (2008) empirically proved, the efforts of increasing both MI and KAOPEN is essentially the same 
as lowering the level of exchange rate stability. Models () and (3) predict that lower ERS leads to lower output 
volatility. But these models also predict that if the country holds IR more than thresholds, it would have to face 
higher output volatility, which is found in model (2). 
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Among the external finance variables, the more “other” capital inflows, i.e., banking 
lending or more net portfolio inflows, a country receives, the more likely it is to experience 
higher output volatility, reflecting the fact that countries that experience macroeconomic 
turmoil often experience an increase in inflows of bank lending or “hot money” such as 
portfolio investment. Total ��e�t service is foun�� to �e a positive contri�utor to output 
volatility while short-term ��e�t ��oes not seem to have an effect. These results contrast 
with the conventional wis��om regar��ing short-term external ��e�t.28 
 3.  �nflation Volatility 
The regression models for inflation volatility do not turn out to be as significant as those 
for output volatility, including the performance of the trilemma indexes. The findings on 
the macro varia�les are generally consistent with the literature. Countries with higher 
relative income tend to experience lower inflation volatility, and naturally, those with higher 
levels of inflation and those that experience currency crises are expected to experience 
higher inflation volatility. The TOT shock increases inflation volatility, but only for emerging 
market economies.
The performance of the trilemma in��exes appears to �e the weakest for this group of 
estimations. However, exchange rate sta�ility is now a volatility-increasing factor, which 
is contrary to what has been found in the literature (such as Ghosh, et al., 1997) and 
somewhat counterintuitive, because countries with more fixity in their exchange rates 
should experience lower inflation and thereby lower inflation volatility. One possible 
explanation is that countries with fixed exchange rates tend to lack fiscal discipline and 
eventually experience ��evaluation as Tornell an�� Velasco (2000) argue.29 When we 
inclu��e the interaction term �etween the crisis ��ummy an�� the E�S varia�le to isolate the 
effect of exchange rate stability for the crisis countries, the estimated coefficient on ERS 
still remains with the same magnitude and statistical significance.
Even when the model incorporates external finances, the estimation results remain to be 
weak, except for FDI inflows and total debt service. While FDI inflows are found to be 
inflation stabilizers, total debt service can be destabilizing inflation, both consistent with 
the literature. 
 4. �edium�Run Level of �nflation
The models for the medium-run level of inflation fit as well as those for output volatility. 
Higher inflation volatility, higher M2 growth, and oil price shocks are associated with 
28 One might suspect that this result can be driven by multicollinearity between the short-term debt variable and 
the variables for the various net inflows. However, even when the three net inflow variables are removed from the 
models, still the total debt service continues to be a positive factor while the short-term debt variable continues to 
be an insignificant one. 
29 Tornell and Velasco argue that while countries with flexible exchange rates face the cost of having lax fiscal policy 
immediately, countries with fixed exchange rates tend to lack fiscal discipline because “under fixed rates bad 
behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow.” 
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higher inflation. Also, when the world economy is experiencing a boom, developing 
countries tend to experience higher inflation, which presumably reflects strong demand for 
goo��s pro��uce�� an�� exporte�� �y ��eveloping countries.
Among the trilemma variables, greater exchange rate stability leads to lower inflation for 
�oth ��eveloping an�� emerging market economies, a result consistent with the literature 
(such as Ghosh et al., 1997). This finding and the previously found positive association 
�etween exchange rate sta�ility an�� output volatility are in line with the theoretical 
pre��iction that esta�lishing sta�le exchange rates is a tra��e-off issue for policy makers�� it 
will help the country to achieve lower inflation by showing a higher level of credibility and 
commitment, �ut at the same time, the efforts of maintaining sta�le exchange rates will 
rid policy makers of an important adjustment mechanism through fluctuating exchange 
rates. 
The estimations for both subsamples show that the more financially open a developing 
country is, the lower inflation it will experience. Interestingly, the more open to trade a 
country is, the more likely it is to experience lower inflation for the LDC regressions. 
The negative association between “openness” and inflation has been the subject of 
��e�ate as glo�alization has procee��e��.30 Romer (1993), extending the Barro-Gordon 
(1983) model, verified that the more open to trade a country becomes, the less 
motivated its monetary authorities are to inflate, suggesting a negative link between 
trade openness and inflation. Razin and Binyamini (2007) predicted that both trade and 
financial liberalization will flatten the Phillips curve, so that policy makers will become 
less responsive to output gaps and more aggressive in fighting inflation.31 Here, across 
��ifferent su�samples of ��eveloping countries, we present evi��ence consistent with the 
negative openness-inflation relationship.
The extended version of the regressions that incorporate external finances generally 
retain the same characteristics. But for emerging market economies, the interaction term 
�etween E�S an�� international reserves hol��ing is foun�� to have a positive impact on the 
rate of inflation. Models (8) and (9) in Table 4-2 show that if the ratio of reserves holding�� � ��              
to GDP is greater than about 24%, the efforts of pursuing exchange rate stability can help�          
increase the level of inflation. This means that countries with excess levels of reserves 
hol��ing will eventually face the limit in the efforts of fully sterilizing foreign exchange 
intervention to maintain exchange rate stability—thereby experiencing higher inflation. In 
the LDC sample (Table 4-1), we can find the same kind of threshold in models (8) and 
(9); financial openness can lead to lower inflation, but only up to the case when IR hold is 
below 21–22% as a ratio to GDP. Considering that only in a financially open economy do 
monetary authorities face the nee�� for foreign exchange interventions, the threshol�� of I� 
holding for financial openness can be interpreted in the same way as that for exchange 
30 Rogoff (2003) argues that globalization contributes to dwindling mark-ups, and therefore, disinflation.
3 Loungani et al. (200) provides empirical evidence that countries with greater restrictions on capital mobility face 
steeper Phillips curves.
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rate sta�ility. This means that there are limits to sterilize�� interventions, an�� that it is 
more binding for financially open economies. Aizenman and Glick (2008) and Glick 
and Hutchison (2008) show that the PRC has started facing more inflationary pressure 
in 2007 when allege��ly intervening the foreign exchange market intensively to sustain 
exchange rate stability. This finding indicates that sterilized interventions would eventually 
lead to a rise in expected inflation if they are conducted as an effort to maintain monetary 
independence and exchange rate stability while having somewhat open financial markets. 
The rise in the inflationary pressure provides evidence that policy makers cannot evade 
the constraint of the trilemma. 
Lastly, among the external finances variables, FDI is found to be an inflation reducer. One 
possible explanation is that countries tend to stabilize inflation movement to attract FDI. 
�astly, an�� unsurprisingly, higher levels of total ��e�t services are foun�� to help increase 
inflation for the LDC sample.
B. �mplications for Asia
In the growth regressions, we learne�� that investment ratios, exchange rate sta�ility, 
financial openness, bank lending inflows, and low levels of total debt services are the 
positive contri�utors to economic growth among ��eveloping countries. How ��o these 
varia�les �ehave for the Asian economies? In �igure 4, we have seen that Asia on 
average maintaine�� the me��ium level of exchange rate sta�ility, �ut that its level is not as 
high as that of other non-Asian ��eveloping countries. Asian economies, especially those 
with emerging markets, have achieved the medium level of financial openness since the 
1980s, but have not experienced rapid financial liberalization as Latin American emerging 
market economies have ��one. �igure 5 reports that Asian emerging market economies 
are currently net recipients of �DI an�� net provi��ers of portfolio an�� �ank len��ing after 
the Asian crisis. Before the crisis, however, �oth emerging an�� non-emerging Asian 
economies were more ��epen��ent on �ank len��ing than �DI.32 Both short-term ��e�t 
as a ratio to total external debt and total debt service as a ratio to GNI have stayed at 
relatively high levels for this group of economies.33 Given these observations, the drive 
for high economic growth among Asian emerging market economies can �e narrowe�� 
down to high investment ratios and high levels of bank lending inflows. Especially with 
respect to the link �etween Asia an�� glo�alization, as many researcher have ��iscusse��, 
one of the keys to economic success is the high level of openness to �ank len��ing, which 
may have ha�� a synergistic relationship with ��omestic investment.
The estimation results on the ��eterminants of output volatility also provi��e some 
interesting insights on Asian economic development. The finding that countries can  
reverse the volatility-increasing effect of greater exchange rate sta�ility �y hol��ing higher   
32  It must be noted that the scales are different among different panels of figures in Figure 5.
33  We must remind that the debt data are not available for emerging market economies with relatively high income 
levels such as Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. 
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levels of IR than some threshold (about 13–18% of GDP) may explain the reason why           
many Asian ��eveloping countries hol�� higher levels of I�. Unraveling the motive for I� 
hol��ing also has an important implication for the current glo�al crisis. Some economists 
argue that the efforts ma��e �y Asian economies to hol�� I� in an attempt to sta�ilize     
their exchange rates coul�� have expan��e�� liqui��ity rapi��ly in glo�al capital markets an�� 
contributed to finance profligacy in the advanced countries including the housing bubble 
in the US. Hence, we ��o nee�� to she�� further light on how I� hol��ing an�� the exchange 
rate regime interact with each other. 
�igure 6 shows the marginal interactive effects �etween E�S an�� I� �ase�� on the 
estimates from Column 3 of Table 3-2. For presentation purposes, the EMG group of 
countries is ��ivi��e�� into three su�groups: (i) an Asian group, (ii) a �atin American group, 
and (iii) all other EMG countries. In all the panels of figures, the contours are drawn to 
present ��ifferent levels of the effect of E�S on output volatility con��itional on the level 
of IR. The solid horizontal line refers to the threshold of IR at 18% of GDP, above which 
higher levels of E�S has a negative impact on output volatility.34 �or example, the soli�� 
contour line a�ove the threshol�� shows the com�inations of E�S an�� I� that lea�� to a 
one percentage point reduction in output volatility. In the figure, the further toward the 
northeast corner in the panel, i.e., the higher level of E�S an�� I� a country pursues, the 
more negative the impact on output volatility. Below the threshol��, however, it is true that 
the further towar�� the southeast corner, i.e., the higher level of E�S an�� the lower level 
of I� a country pursues, the more positive the impact on output volatility. In each of the 
panels, the scatter ��iagrams of E�S an�� I� are superimpose��. The �lack circles in��icate 
E�S an�� I� for 2002–2006 an�� the re�� “x’s” for 1992–1996.35 
34  In Model (3) in Table 3-2, ˘ ˘ ( )α α1 3TLM TLM IRit it it+ ×  for ERS is found to be 0 012 0 066. . ( )ERS ERS IRit it it− × . If the 
marginal effect is –%, it must be that − = − ×0 01 0 012 0 066. . . ( )ERS ERS IRit it it . If we solve this for IR, then we 
obtain IR ERSit it
= − −0 012
0 066
0 01
0 066
.
.
.
. . We repeat this calculation for the –2% impact, –3% impact, etc., to create the 
other contours. 
35  The estimated coefficient on IR (level) is significantly positive in Column () of Table 3-2, which indicates the 
volatility-enhancing effect of IR itself. Hence, it is essentially a trade-off between holding more IR and pursuing 
greater exchange rate stability once the level of IR surpasses the threshold level. The analysis presented in Figure 6 
focuses on the marginal effect of ERS and how it changes depending on the level of IR while keeping in mind that 
higher levels of IR is volatility-increasing.
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Figure 6: �nteractive Effects of Exchange Rate Stability and �R �olding
Jordan x
Morocco x
+0.5% pt +1% pt
0 .2 .4
Exchange Rate Stability
.6 .8 1
(b) Latin American EMGs
1992–96 (red-x) vs. 2002-06 (black circle)
1.2
1
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
IR
 h
ol
di
ng
 (%
 o
f G
D
P)
Venezuela, RB x Chile x
Peru x Colombia x
Trinidad and Tobago xMexico x Argentina x
Ecuador xBrazil x
Jamaica xBrazil
Chile
Mexico
Colombia
Argentina
Ecuador
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela, RBJamaicaPeru
+0.5% pt +1% pt
-0.5% pt -2% pt -3% pt -4% pt -5% pt -6% pt
-1% pt
-7% pt
0 .2 .4
Exchange Rate Stability
.6 .8 1
(c) Other EMGs
1992–96 (red-x) vs. 2002-06 (black circle)
1.2
1
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
IR
 h
ol
di
ng
 (%
 o
f G
D
P)
-0.5% pt -2% pt -3% pt -4% pt -5% pt -6% pt -7% pt
-0.5% pt
(a) Asian EMGs
1992–96 (red-x) vs. 2002-06 (black circle)
+0.5% pt +1% pt
-2% pt -3% pt -4% pt -5% pt -6% pt
-1% pt
-7% pt1.2
1
.8
.6
.4
.2
0
Singapore
Taipei,China
Hong Kong,
China
PRC
Singapore x
Taipei,China xMalaysia x
Philippines x
Malaysia
Thailand
Thailand x
Korea, Rep. of
Indonesia
Cambodia
Cambodia x
Hong Kong, China x
PRC x
Korea, Rep. of x India xViet Nam xIndonesia x
Viet Nam
0 .2 .4
Exchange Rate Stability
.6 .8 1
IR
 h
ol
di
ng
 (%
 o
f G
D
P)
Philippines
India
EgyptCzech Republic x
MoroccoSlovenia
RussiaNigeria
Tunisia
Hungary
Israel
South Africa x
Slovak Republic xBulgaria x
Lithuania xKenya x
Slovak Republic x
Slovania xTunisi  
Israel x
Tunisia x
Botswana x
-1% pt
Botswana
Jordan
BulgariaSlovak Republic
P landTurkey
South Afric
Zimbabwe
Ghana
Cote d’lvoire
Lithuania
Cote d’lvoire x
Nigeria x
Mauritius x
Hungary x
Russia x
Zimbabwe x
Turkey x
Ghana xPoland x
Egypt xCzech Republic
Mauritius
Ghana x
Poland x
Kenya
GDP = gross domestic product, EMG= emerging market economies, IR = international reserves.
These ��iagrams highlight several interesting o�servations. �irst, from the 1992 to 1996 
an�� 2002 to 2006 perio��s, perio��s that encompass the last wave of glo�al crises whose 
epicenter was in Asia, many countries, especially those in East Asia an�� Eastern Europe, 
increase�� their I� hol��ing a�ove the threshol��. Secon��, the movement is not necessarily 
towar�� the northeast ��irection. �ather, it is aroun�� the threshol�� level where the effect of 
E�S is neutral (i.e., zero percentage point impact), unless they move much higher towar�� 
output volatility-re��ucing territory (such as Bulgaria an�� the P�C). �ast, only a han��ful of 
economies have achieved combinations of ERS and IR that significantly reduce output 
volatility. Such economies inclu��e Botswana�� P�C�� Hong Kong, China�� Malaysia�� Jor��an�� 
an�� Singapore. However, the fact that three Asian economies are among the countries 
with large I� hol��ing an�� great E�S may explain why Asian economies are often 
perceive�� to �e currency manipulators although they are more of exceptions than  
the rule.
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C. Further �nvestigation into Output Volatility and Trilemma Choices 
 A. Channels to Output Volatility
Given the current state of the world economy, one cannot help but focus on the 
estimation results for output volatility. One natural question that arises is through what 
channels ��o these factors contri�ute to output volatility. To answer this question, we      
estimate similar mo��els for output volatility �ut replace the ��epen��ent varia�le with real 
exchange rate sta�ility, through which net exports can �e affecte��, an�� the volatility of 
investment. This exercise shoul�� help us examine whether an�� to what extent policy 
choices can ��iffer ��epen��ing on the extent of economic openness.
 1. Results on �nvestment Volatility and Real Exchange Rate Volatility
The results shown in columns (1) through (3) of Ta�le 5 correspon�� to investment 
volatility an�� those (4) through (6) of Ta�le 5 correspon�� to real exchange rate sta�ility 
specifications. However, for the estimation of the real exchange rate stability, some of the 
explanatory varia�les are change���� the varia�les for the change in the US real interest 
rate, fiscal procyclicality, and financial development (measured by private credit creation 
as a ratio to GDP) are dropped from the estimation, and replaced with inflation volatility, 
and differentials in inflation volatility between the home and base countries are included 
instea��.36
By comparing the results of these different specifications with dependent variables, we 
can make some interesting o�servations. �irst, we can also o�serve the negative effect of 
monetary in��epen��ence on the investment volatility estimation as we ��i�� in that on output 
volatility. However, if the level of IR holding is above 15–20% of GDP, higher monetary     
in��epen��ence coul�� lea�� to higher volatility in investment. This may �e �ecause higher 
levels of international reserves coul�� lea�� to higher levels of liqui��ity, thus to more volatile 
movement in the cost of capital. Secon��, while a higher ��egree of exchange rate sta�ility 
coul�� (unsurprisingly) in��uce greater real exchange rate sta�ility, it coul�� also lea�� to 
more volatile investment. But as was the case with output volatility, if the level of I� 
hol��ing excee��s a given threshol��, greater exchange rate sta�ility re��uces investment 
volatility.37 Third, financial openness has a negative impact on both real exchange rate 
stability and investment volatility. Hence, we can conclude that financial liberalization 
coul�� help re��uce output volatility �y making �oth real exchange rate an�� investment 
more sta�le. �ast, the investment volatility regressions show that net portfolio an�� �ank 
lending inflows can be volatility-increasing, although banking lending inflows can reduce 
real exchange rate volatility.
36  Interest rate differentials are also tested, but did not turn out to be significant. Therefore, they are not included in 
the estimation. 
37  The threshold levels of IR holding are 8% of GDP in model () and 28% of GDP in model (3) in Table 5-. In Table 
5-2, they are 4% in model () and 26% in model (3).
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Table 5�1: Determinants of Output Volatility: Less Developed Countries (LDC)
�nvestment Volatility Real Exchange Rate Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative Income −0. −0.5 −0.25 −0.06 0.027 −0.05
[0.43] [0.42] [0.39] [0.020] [0.03] [0.020]
Relative Income, sq. 0.2 0.239 0.2 0.07 −0.04 0.09
[0.264] [0.265] [0.258] [0.037] [0.057] [0.038]
Change in US real interest 
  rate 0.39 0.306 0.259
[0.99]* [0.98] [0.94]
Volatility of TOT*OPN 0.095 0.2 0.03 0.008 0.0 0.008
[0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.035]*** [0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
Inflation volatility 0.34 0.33 0.3 0.038 0.03 0.038
  (Infl. vol. differentials in 
  (4)-(6)) [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]***
Fiscal Procyclicality −0.00 0.003 0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Trade openness −0.005 −0.0 −0.005
[0.003]* [0.004]*** [0.003]*
Currency Crisis 0.0 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.03 0.009
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Private credit creation −0.0 −0.02 −0.00
[0.026] [0.026] [0.025]
Total Reserve (as % of GDP) −0.229 −0.393 0.58 0.022 0.038 −0.03
[0.20] [0.205]* [0.32] [0.030] [0.045] [0.09]
Monetary Independence (MI) −0.8 −0.59 0.004 0.024
[0.056]*** [0.057]*** [0.008] [0.02]**
MI x reserves .93 0.785 −0.049 −0.086
[0.342]*** [0.35]** [0.048] [0.076]
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 0.077 0.07 −0.037 −0.038
[0.026]*** [0.025]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
ERS x reserves −0.43 −0.254 −0.007 0.00
[0.79]** [0.70] [0.025] [0.024]
KA Openness −0.042 −0.02 −0.008 −0.004
[0.032] [0.030] [0.007] [0.004]
KAOPEN x reserves 0.223 0.05 0.029 0.09
[0.78] [0.65] [0.038] [0.024]
Net FDI inflows/GDP 0.327 0.347 0.25 −0.04 −0.088 −0.033
[0.274] [0.280] [0.272] [0.04] [0.064] [0.042]
Net portfolio inflows/GDP .48 .44 .364 0.052 0.046 0.054
[0.493]*** [0.508]*** [0.494]*** [0.069] [0.08] [0.07]
Net ‘other’ inflows/GDP 0.376 0.38 0.48 −0.028 −0.04 −0.028
[0.6]*** [0.6]*** [0.2]*** [0.06]* [0.025] [0.06]*
Short-term Debt −0.042 −0.042 −0.042 0.006 0.004 0.007
  (as % of total external debt) [0.063] [0.063] [0.062] [0.008] [0.03] [0.008]
Total debt service 0.264 0.232 0.23 0.02 0.08 0.02
  (as % of GNI) [0.40]* [0.38]* [0.36] [0.020] [0.03]*** [0.02]
Observations 309 309 309 30 30 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.3 0.26 0.25 0.63 0.29 0.63
GDP = gross domestic product, GNI = gross national income, KA = capital account, KAOPEN = capital account openness, TOT = terms 
of trade, US = United States.
Robust regressions are implemented. * significant at 0%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at %. The dummy for Sub-Saharan 
countries is included in the regressions for output and inflation volatility, so are the dummies for Latin America and Caribbean and 
East Europe and Central Asia in the regression for the level of inflation.
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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 2. Results on Other Aspects of �acroeconomic Performance
A����itionally, we repeat the same exercise for a����itional varia�les pertaining to other 
aspects of macroeconomic performance, namely, the volatility of final consumption—the 
sum of private consumption and government expenditure, the volatility of GNI, and the 
ratio of the two varia�les. The motivation for these estimations is twofol��. �irst, we nee�� 
to ensure if there are channels other than investment an�� net exports through which the 
trilemma policy configurations can affect output volatility. Second, the ratio of the volatility 
of GNI to that of final consumption is essentially a proxy to the measure of risk sharing. 
In other words, a higher value of the ratio means a smaller volatility of final consumption 
compared to that of GNI, which can arise when economic agents successfully diversify 
risk an�� smooth consumption. Hence, if trilemma policy choices are foun�� to re��uce the 
ratio, that can �e interprete�� as evi��ence for successful international risk sharing.38 
The regression results for final consumption volatility are not robust in terms of not only 
the macroeconomic control varia�les, �ut also of the trilemma varia�les (not reporte��). 
Although the weak estimation results may indicate a possibility of misspecification in 
these regressions, this finding suggests at least that the channel of final consumption can 
be ruled out; it is either investment or net exports through which trilemma configurations 
affect output volatility. 
While the estimation results for GNI are found to be quite similar to the estimation of 
output volatility, the estimation on the ratio of GNI volatility to final consumption volatility 
��o not perform well at all. Consi��ering that home �ias is much more pervasive in 
developing countries, the insignificant results are not surprising. Developing countries are 
not reaping the benefits of international risk sharing, though that could also mean that 
there is room for these countries to reap the benefit from financial liberalization.
D. Policy �mplications and Asia
In the previous exercise, we foun�� ��ifferent ��ynamics �etween the investment volatility 
mo��el an�� the mo��el on real exchange rate volatility. This ��ifference shoul�� suggest that 
the effect of international macroeconomic policy configurations differ depending upon 
how much weight policy makers place �etween these two policy goals. �or example, if 
policy makers put greater weight on real exchange rate sta�ility, it is �etter to pursue 
more exchange rate stability and greater financial openness (which implies lower levels 
of monetary in��epen��ence), which coul�� have a volatility-enhancing impact on investment 
an�� output, although the answer ��epen��s on the level of I� hol��ing. More concretely, the 
results from mo��el (1) in Ta�le 5-2 show that greater (weaker) monetary in��epen��ence 
increase (��ecrease) real exchange rate volatility. The estimation results also in��icate 
38 However, plotting the time series of the ratio of final consumption volatility to GNI volatility is not promising. 
While the ratio appears to be trending up moderately among industrialized countries, i.e., they are reaping the 
benefits of diversifying risk and smoothing consumption, there is no discernable trend for the group of developing 
economies. 
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that the threshold of IR holding level (as a ratio to GDP) for greater (weaker) monetary 
independence to have a positive (negative) effect on investment volatility is 15% of GDP, 
whereas that for greater (weaker) exchange rate sta�ility to have a negative (positive) 
effect is 16%. Hence, if an emerging market country hol��s a higher level of I� higher 
than 16% an�� tries to pursue a higher level of exchange rate sta�ility an�� a lower level 
monetary in��epen��ence (i.e., a com�ination of greater exchange rate sta�ility an�� greater 
financial openness), that country could achieve lower levels of not only real exchange 
rate sta�ility, �ut also investment. This result may explain why many emerging market 
economies—especially those that are more open to international tra��e such as Asian 
emerging market economies—ten�� to prefer exchange rate sta�ility an�� hol��ing a 
massive amount of IR while pursuing financial liberalization. 
This finding is significantly relevant to Asian economies. Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows 
the average ratio of tra��e openness (the sum of exports an�� imports as a ratio to 
GDP) to the investment rate (as a ratio to GDP) from 1990 to 2006 for different groups 
of ��eveloping countries. While the ratio for the group of non-emerging market Asian 
��eveloping economies is �elow the average for the entire group of ��eveloping countries, 
the ratio for the Asian emerging market economies (EMG) is the highest among the 
regional su�groups. This means that the results shown in columns (4) through (6) of 
Ta�les 5-1 an�� 5-2 are more relevant to this group of economies than any other group. 
Our estimation results in��icate that more open economies coul�� re��uce volatility in �oth 
investment an�� real exchange rate �y pursuing more sta�le exchange rate as long as 
they hol�� higher levels of I�. Panels (�) through (��) show the perio�� averages of I� 
holding (% of GDP), ERS, and MI, respectively. In Panel (b), the level of IR holding for 
the Asian EMG is much greater than the threshold of 15–16% we just discussed above, 
though �oth E�S an�� MI are aroun�� the group averages of ��eveloping countries. These 
panels of figures at least indicate that Asian emerging market economies seem to have 
pursue�� international macroeconomic policies that allow their massive I� hol��ing to 
re��uce the level of volatility in �oth investment an�� the real exchange rates. In fact, 
according to Figure 8, the level of investment volatility for Asian EMGs is lower than any 
other group of ��eveloping countries an�� compara�le to that of in��ustrialize�� countries 
(except for the 1990s �ecause of the Asian crisis). These economies have also achieve�� 
low levels of real exchange rate volatility, again compara�le to that of in��ustrialize�� 
countries.
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Figure 7: Regional Comparison of Trade Openness and Exchange Rate Stability
(a) Ratio of Trade Openness ((EX+IM)/Y)
to Investment Rate (% of GDP): 1990−2006
(c) Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)
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E & C = east and central, EMG = emerging market economies, GDP = gross domestic product, LATAM = Latin America, LDC = less 
developed countries.
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Table 5�2: Determinants of Output Volatility: Emerging �arket Economies (E�G)
�nvestment volatility Real exchange rate volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative Income 0.237 0.9 0.93 −0.045 0.072 −0.073
[0.254] [0.272] [0.255] [0.054] [0.074] [0.050]
Relative Income, sq. −0.625 −0.36 −0.452 0.099 −0.08 0.76
[0.557] [0.604] [0.56] [0.8] [0.66] [0.2]
Change in US real interest 
  rate −0. −0.07 −0.34
[0.28] [0.232] [0.22]
Volatility of TOT*OPN −0.098 −0.022 −0.09 0.02 0.002 0.09
[0.056]* [0.059] [0.055] [0.0]* [0.06] [0.00]*
Inflation volatility 0.43 0.5 0.42 0.05 0.038 0.05
  (Infl. vol. differentials in 
  (4)-(6)) [0.028]*** [0.029]*** [0.027]*** [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.005]***
Fiscal Procyclicality 0.07 0.04 0.02
[0.00] [0.0] [0.00]*
Trade openness −0.004 −0.004 −0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Currency Crisis 0.038 0.033 0.034 0.0 0.03 0.009
[0.02]*** [0.03]** [0.02]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]***
Private credit creation 0.025 0.004 0.033
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024]
Total Reserve (as % of GDP) −0.374 −.045 0.368 0.035 0.052 0.00
[0.92]* [0.2]*** [0.8]*** [0.040] [0.058] [0.023]
Monetary Independence  
  (MI) −0.286 −0.365 0.027 0.042
[0.060]*** [0.066]*** [0.03]** [0.08]**
MI x reserves .867 2.095 −0.068 −0.23
[0.306]*** [0.353]*** [0.064] [0.096]
Exchange Rate Stability 
  (ERS) 0.27 0.2 −0.039 −0.037
[0.032]*** [0.030]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]***
ERS x reserves −0.88 −0.583 −0.02 −0.006
[0.83]*** [0.73]*** [0.037] [0.033]
KA Openness −0.065 0.026 −0.00 −0.009
[0.034]* [0.029] [0.009] [0.006]
KAOPEN x reserves 0.44 −0.38 −0.03 0.0
[0.75]** [0.44] [0.047] [0.028]
Net FDI inflows/GDP −0.26 0.237 −0.433 −0.054 −0.4 0.024
[0.373] [0.422] [0.384] [0.08] [0.7] [0.077]
Net portfolio inflows/GDP 0.76 .34 0.736 −0.043 −0.49 −0.08
[0.488] [0.543]** [0.497] [0.02] [0.47] [0.097]
Net ‘other’ inflows/GDP 0.586 0.637 0.6 −0.078 −0.08 −0.056
[0.3]*** [0.39]*** [0.27]*** [0.027]*** [0.038]** [0.025]**
Short-term Debt −0.02 −0.07 −0.3 0.04 −0.002 0.009
  (as % of total external 
  debt) [0.067] [0.072] [0.066]* [0.03] [0.07] [0.0]
Total debt service 0.72 0.277 0.82 0.027 0.034 0.032
  (as % of GNI) [0.55] [0.65]* [0.5] [0.038] [0.052] [0.035]
Observations 49 49 49 5 5 5
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.68 0.39 0.69
FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product, GNI = gross national income, KA = capital account, 
KAOPEN = capital account openness, TOT = terms of trade, US = United States.
Robust regressions are implemented. * significant at 0%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at %. The dummy for Sub-Saharan 
countries is included in the regressions for output and inflation volatility, so are the dummies for Latin America and Caribbean and 
East Europe and Central Asia in the regression for the level of inflation.
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8: Regional Comparison of �nvestment Volatility and Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
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�igure 9 illustrates the estimate�� effects of the three trilemma varia�les on investment 
volatility an�� real exchange rate volatility calculate�� using the estimation results shown in 
Ta�le 5-1.39 The panels of �igure 9 allow us to make four interesting o�servations for the 
Asian economies. �irst, exchange rate sta�ility an�� its interaction with I� hol��ing have 
contributed significantly to lowering the real exchange rate volatility over years, which is 
also the case with the non-Asian ��eveloping economies (�ottom two panels). Secon��, 
39 That is, the bars in the panels of figures refer to ˘ ˘ ( )α α1 3TLM TLM IRit it it+ ×  for each of the trilemma indexes and its 
interaction with IR holding. The estimated effects are calculated using the estimated coefficients and actual values 
for the trilemma indexes and the IR ratio. However, because only two out of the three trilemma variables are 
included in the estimations, the estimation results from two types of regressions: one with MI and ERS included in 
TLMit and the other with ERS and KAOPEN, are used to calculate the estimated effects for all the three indexes. The 
estimated effect of ERS is, however, based on the average of the estimated coefficients for the two regressions.
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among Asian ��eveloping economies, exchange rate sta�ility an�� its interaction with I� 
hol��ing lowere�� investment volatility especially in 2002–2006. Thir��, the three policies, 
on net, appear to have contri�ute�� negatively to volatilities in �oth investment an�� real 
exchange rate in the post-Asian crisis period. Last, the effect of financial openness and 
I� hol��ing is minimal for this group of economies. 
Figure 9: The �mpacts of the Trilemma Configurations on �nvestment Volatility and Real 
Exchange Rate Volatility
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�or the non-Asian ��eveloping economies, on the other han��, it is monetary in��epen��ence 
that has �een a negative contri�utor to investment volatility over years though its impact 
��win��le�� in the last perio��. �urthermore, unlike the Asian su�group, exchange rate 
sta�ility has �een a positive contri�utor to investment volatility though its impact seems to 
have �een tren��ing ��ownwar��. Hence, the Asian economies seem to have �een a�le to 
lessen the volatilities of investment an�� real exchange rate �y pursuing greater E�S an�� 
having high levels of I� especially in the last 5-year perio��.
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V. Concluding Remarks 
About 1 year after the onset of the most severe global crisis since the Great Depression, 
in the summer of 2009, we starte�� o�serving some signs of recovery, though none of 
them yet suggeste�� sustaina�le recovery. Among the economies with signs of recovery, 
Asia has impresse�� the worl�� with its most ro�ust recovery, attracting scrutiny from �oth 
the aca��emic an�� policy communities.40 This paper attempte�� to make an a����ition to the 
scrutiny by focusing on how the region has dealt with the waves of financial globalization 
through configuring international macroeconomic policies. For this exploration, we have 
focused on a fundamental principle in international finance, called the “impossible trinity” 
or “trilemma”—an economy can concurrently implement at full capacity only two out of 
the three international macroeconomic policies: monetary in��epen��ence, exchange rate 
stability, and financial openness. 
The “trilemma in��exes” ��evelope�� �y Aizenman et al. (2008) allow us to trace the 
changing patterns of the trilemma configurations among countries and bring to light 
striking ��ifferences �etween the choices of in��ustrialize�� an�� ��eveloping countries 
��uring 1970–2007. The recent tren�� suggests that in��ustrialize�� countries have �een 
experiencing ��ivergence of the three ��imensions of the trilemma, an�� move�� towar�� the 
configuration of high exchange rate stability and financial openness and low monetary 
independence as most distinctively exemplified by the euro countries’ experience. 
Emerging market economies, on the other han��, appear to �e converging towar�� a 
“middle ground” with managed exchange rate flexibility, while maintaining medium levels 
of monetary independence and financial integration. Interestingly, for Asian emerging 
market economies, convergence is not a recent phenomenon�� since as early as the 
1980s, the three in��exes have �een clustere�� aroun�� the mi����le range, though exchange 
rate sta�ility has �een the most pervasive policy choice. Another, more recent iconic 
trait of this group of economies is the high level of I� hol��ing, which this paper also 
incorporates into the analysis. 
The fact that policy configurations based on the trilemma have evolved over the years 
must mean that com�inations of the three policies shoul�� have strengths an�� weaknesses 
in terms of managing the macroeconomy. As such, this stu��y examine�� how trilemma 
policy configurations can affect various aspects of macroeconomic performances, namely, 
per capita output growth, output volatility, inflation volatility, and the medium-term rate 
of inflation in an attempt to explain why the economies in the Asian region, especially 
those with emerging markets, have achieve�� sta�le macroeconomic ��evelopment. To 
reveal potential uniqueness of the Asian economies, we resorte�� to panel ��ata analysis 
to examine the correlation between trilemma configurations and macroeconomic 
performances while properly controlling for the complexity of other macroeconomic 
con��itions.
40 See the 5 August 2009 issue of The Economist for a report on Asia’s recovery from the financial crisis of 2008–
2009. 
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A series of empirical analyses yielded interesting findings. First, the results from the 
growth regressions provi��e�� very weak evi��ence that per capita economic growth can �e 
affected by policy choices among the three trilemma policies as well as external finances 
such as cross-border flows of FDI, portfolio investment, and bank lending. This finding is 
not surprising given that theory predicts conflicting effects on economic growth for all the 
three policy goals. Our estimation results confirmed the ambivalence.
Second, we investigated how the policy configurations based on the trilemma affect 
other macroeconomic performances such as output volatility, inflation volatility, and the 
medium-term level of inflation, and found some of the policy choices significantly affect 
output volatility and the rate of inflation. More specifically, higher levels of monetary 
in��epen��ence are associate�� with lower output volatility. Countries with higher levels of 
exchange rate fixity tend to experience higher output volatility, though this effect can be 
mitigate�� �y hol��ing a higher level of international reserves than the threshol�� of a�out 
20% of GDP. This result is consistent with the phenomenon of many emerging market 
economies accumulating massive international reserves. 
We also foun�� that countries with greater monetary autonomy ten�� to experience higher          
inflation while countries with higher exchange rate stability tend to experience lower   
inflation. Furthermore, financial openness helps a country to achieve lower inflation. 
However, we foun�� some evi��ence that if countries pursue greater exchange rate 
stability and financial openness while holding a sizeable amount of international reserves 
through foreign exchange intervention, they can experience a rise in the level of inflation, 
suggesting that countries with excess levels of reserves hol��ing may eventually face a 
limit in foreign exchange sterilization.
We focused on the impact of the trilemma policy configurations on output volatility and 
examined through what channels the trilemma policy configurations affect output volatility. 
The estimation results of the regression on investment volatility turne�� out to share similar 
characteristics with the regression on output volatility, suggesting that trilemma policy 
configurations and external finances affect output volatility through investment. More 
specifically, like in the estimation on output volatility, greater monetary independence is 
foun�� to help re��uce investment volatility. However, if the level of I� hol��ing gets a�ove 
15–20% of GDP, greater monetary independence would become volatility-enhancing for 
investment �y provi��ing too much liqui��ity an�� there�y making the cost of capital too 
volatile. While a higher ��egree of exchange rate sta�ility coul�� sta�ilize the real exchange 
rate movement, it coul�� also make investment volatile, though the volatility-enhancing 
effect of exchange rate sta�ility on investment can �e cancelle�� �y hol��ing higher levels 
of IR. Greater financial openness is found to help reduce real exchange rate volatility. 
These results in��icate that policy makers in a more open economy woul�� prefer pursuing 
greater exchange rate stability and greater financial openness while holding a massive 
amount of I� �ecause this policy com�ination woul�� help them sta�ilize �oth investment 
and real exchange rate. This finding might help explain why small, open economies in 
East Asia hol�� massive amounts of I�.  
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Overall, Asian economies, especially the ones with emerging markets, are foun�� to �e 
equipped with macroeconomic policy configurations that help the economies to dampen 
the volatilities in �oth investment an�� real exchange rate. These economies’ sizea�le 
amount of I� hol��ing appears to help enhance the sta�ilizing effect of the trilemma policy 
choices, which explains the recent phenomenal �uil��up of I� in the region.
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Appendix 1: Construction of the Trilemma �easures
Monetary Independence (MI)
The extent of monetary in��epen��ence is measure�� as the reciprocal of the annual correlation of 
the monthly interest rates �etween the home country an�� the �ase country. Money market rates 
are use��.1
The index for the extent of monetary independence is defined as:
MI = 1
1
1 1
−
− −
− −
corr i ii j( , ) ( )
( )
where i refers to home countries an�� j to the �ase country. By construction, the maximum 
value is 1, an�� the minimum value is 0. Higher values of the in��ex mean more monetary policy 
in��epen��ence.2,3 
Here, the base country is defined as the country that a home country’s monetary policy is most 
closely linke�� with as in Sham�augh (2004). The �ase countries are Australia, Belgium, �rance, 
Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the 
countries an�� years for which Sham�augh’s ��ata are availa�le, the �ase countries from his work 
are use��, an�� for the others, the �ase countries are assigne�� �ase�� on the International Monetary 
�un��’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions an�� Central 
Intelligence Agency Factbook.
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)
To measure exchange rate sta�ility, annual stan��ar�� ��eviations of the monthly exchange rate 
�etween the home country an�� the �ase country are calculate�� an�� inclu��e�� in the following 
formula to normalize the in��ex �etween 0 an�� 1:
 The data are extracted from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (60B..ZF...). For the countries whose money 
market rates are unavailable or extremely limited, the money market data are supplemented by those from the 
Bloomberg terminal and also by the discount rates (60...ZF...) and the deposit rates (60L..ZF...) series from IFS.
2 The index is smoothed out by applying the 3-year moving averages encompassing the preceding, concurrent, and 
following years (t – 1, t, t+1) of observations.
3 We note one important caveat about this index. Among some countries and in some years, especially early ones, 
the interest rate used for the calculation of the MI index is often constant throughout a year, making the annual 
correlation of the interest rates between the home and base countries (corr(ii, ij) in the formula) undefined. Since 
we treat the undefined corr the same as zero, it makes the MI index value 0.5. One may think that the policy 
interest rate being constant (regardless of the base country’s interest rate) is a sign of monetary independence. 
However, it can reflect the possibilities not only that (i) the home country’s monetary policy is independent 
from the base country’s; but also (ii) the home country uses other tools to implement monetary policy than 
manipulating the interest rates, such as changing the required reserve ratios and providing some window 
guidance (while leaving the policy interest rate unchanged); and/or that (iii) the home country implements a 
strong control on financial intermediary, including credit rationing, that makes the policy interest rate appear 
constant. To make the matter more complicated, some countries have used (ii) and (iii) to exercise monetary 
independence while others have used them while strictly following the base country’s monetary policy. The 
bottom line is that it is impossible to incorporate these issues in the calculation of MI without over- or under-
estimating the degree of monetary independence. Therefore, assigning an MI value of 0.5 for such a case should 
be a reasonable compromise. However, it does not preclude the necessity of robustness checks on the index, 
which we plan to undertake.
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stdev exch rate
=
+
0 01
0 01
.
. ( (log( _ ))∆
Merely applying this formula can easily create a ��ownwar�� �ias in the in��ex, that is, it woul�� 
exaggerate the “flexibility” of the exchange rate especially when the rate usually follows a narrow 
�an��, �ut is ��e- or revalue�� infrequently.4 To avoi�� such ��ownwar�� �ias, we also apply a threshol�� 
to the exchange rate movement as has �een ��one in the literature. That is, if the rate of monthly 
change in the exchange rate staye�� within +/-0.33 percent �an��s, we consi��er the exchange 
rate is “fixed” and assign the value of one for the ERS index. Furthermore, single year pegs are 
��roppe�� �ecause they are quite possi�ly not intentional ones.5 Higher values of this in��ex in��icate 
more sta�le movement of the exchange rate against the currency of the �ase country. 
Financial Openness/Integration (KAOPEN)
Without question, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account controls.6 
Although many measures exist to ��escri�e the extent an�� intensity of capital account controls, 
it is generally agree�� that such measures fail to capture fully the complexity of real-worl�� 
capital controls. Nonetheless, for the measure of financial openness, we use the index of 
capital account openness, or KAOPEN, �y Chinn an�� Ito (2006, 2008). KAOPEN is �ase�� on 
information regar��ing restrictions in the International Monetary �un��’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Specifically, KAOPEN is the first standardized principal 
component of the varia�les that in��icate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions 
on current account transactions, on capital account transactions, an�� the requirement of the 
surren��er of export procee��s.7 Since KAOPEN is �ase�� on reporte�� restrictions, it is necessarily 
a de jure in��ex of capital account openness (in contrast to de facto measures such as those in 
�ane an�� Milesi-�erretti [2006]). The choice of a de jure measure of capital account openness is 
��riven �y the motivation to look into policy intentions of the countries�� de facto measures are more 
suscepti�le to other macroeconomic effects than solely policy ��ecisions with respect to capital 
controls.8 
The Chinn-Ito in��ex is normalize�� �etween zero an�� one. Higher values of this in��ex in��icate 
that a country is more open to cross-�or��er capital transactions. The in��ex is originally availa�le 
for 181 countries for 1970 through 2006.9 The ��ata set we examine ��oes not inclu��e the Unite�� 
States. 
4 In such a case, the average of the monthly change in the exchange rate would be so small that even small changes 
could make the standard deviation big and thereby the ERS value small. 
5 The choice of the +/-0.33 percent bands is based on the +/-2% band based on the annual rate, that is often used 
in the literature. Also, to prevent breaks in the peg status due to one-time realignments, any exchange rate that 
had a percentage change of 0 in  out of 2 months is considered fixed. When there are two re/devaluations in 3 
months, then they are considered to be one re/devaluation event, and if the remaining 0 months experience no 
exchange rate movement, then that year is considered to be the year of fixed exchange rate. This way of defining 
the threshold for the exchange rate is in line with the one adopted by Shambaugh (2004).
6 See Chinn and Ito (2008), Edison and Warnock (200), Edwards (200), Edison et al. (2002), and Kose et al. (2006) 
for discussions and comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions. 
7 This index is described in greater detail in Chinn and Ito (2008). 
8 De jure measures of financial openness also face their own limitations. As Edwards (999) discusses, it is often the 
case that the private sector circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory 
capital controls. Also, International Monetary Fund-based variables are too aggregated to capture the subtleties of 
actual capital controls, that is, the direction of capital flows (i.e., inflows or outflows) as well as the type of financial 
transactions targeted. 
9 The original dataset covers 8 countries, but data availability is uneven among the three indexes. MI is available 
for 72 countries; ERS for 82; and KAOPEN for 78. Both MI and ERS start in 960 whereas KAOPEN in 970. For 
MI and ERS are updated to 2008 while KAOPEN is updated only to 2007 because the information ion AREAER is 
available up to 2007.
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Appendix 2: List of “Asian Economies” in the Sample
Emerging �arket 
Economies
Armenia* 0
Azerbaijan* 0
Bangladesh 0
Bhutan* 0
Cambodia 
People’s Republic of China 
Fiji Islands 0
Georgia 0
Hong Kong, China 
India 
Indonesia 
Kazakhstan* 0
Kyrgyz Republic* 0
Korea, Republic of 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0
Malaysia 
Maldives* 0
Micronesia, Federated States of* 0
Mongolia 0
Myanmar* 0
Nepal 0
Pakistan 0
Papua New Guinea* 0
Philippines 
Samoa* 0
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 0
Sri Lanka 0
Tajikistan* 0
Thailand 
Tonga* 0
Turkmenistan* 0
Uzbekistan 0
Viet Nam 
Note: * - not included in the regression estimations
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